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Abstract 
 
Objective. To use Casalino et al.’s (2007) proposed causal pathways of how pay-for-performance 
(P4P) can exacerbate racial/ethnic health care disparities as a framework for analyzing the 
literature and determine the adequacy of the evidence. 
Data Sources/Study Setting. Existing literature (gray and peer-reviewed) on pay-for-performance 
and racial/ethnic health disparities identified from the Ovid Medline database. 
Conceptual Framework. Casalino et al.’s four casual pathways include: “Pathway 1: Reduction 
in income for physicians in poor minority communities,” “Pathway 2: ‘Color-blind’ quality 
improvement programs,” “Pathway 3: ‘Teaching to the test’ might disproportionately affect 
minorities,” and “Pathway 4: Avoiding patients perceived as likely to lower quality scores.”  
Principal Findings. For Pathway 1, there is consistent and strong evidence of harm. With a 
reduction in income for physicians in poor minority community settings, communities and their 
patients are being harmed. For Pathway 2, there is a lack of evidence. However, despite this, 
statistics from outside the P4P literature are consistent in their findings that “color-blind” 
approaches are occurring in health care. For Pathway 3, there is consistent and strong evidence 
of neglect. “Teaching to the test” is occurring, and existing P4P programs do not incorporate 
metrics that can improve disparities. Lastly, for Pathway 4, there is qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, but it is inconclusive. Some studies report avoidance whereas others do not.  
Conclusion. Our health care system must step up to the challenge of accounting for differences in 
patient populations in payment models, such as P4P programs. If we do not, racial and ethnic 
minority patients will continue to suffer as structural inequities built into these programs persist. 
Key Words. Pay-for-performance, racial and ethnic health care disparities, health policy 
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Despite many technical resources and high medical spending, the quality of health care in 
the United States is not where it should be. To improve health care quality, payers are 
increasingly using financial incentives to reward physicians and medical groups that meet 
specific performance targets. Pay-for-performance (P4P), often referred to as value-based 
purchasing, is a specific payment model in which providers are rewarded through bonuses or 
penalized through reductions based on meeting preestablished targets or benchmarks for 
measures of quality and/or efficiency (Damberg et al., 2014). In theory, these initiatives should 
help drive the behavior of providers and health care systems to improve the quality of care 
delivered, reduce unnecessary use of expensive health care services, and improve patient health 
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outcomes (Mendelson et al., 2017). However, even if P4P is effective in reaching these primary 
goals, whether P4P improves quality for all groups of patients needs to be considered.  
Research has shown that the quality of health care for some groups of racial and ethnic 
minority patients (e.g. blacks and Hispanics) is worse than that for whites, and this leads to 
poorer health outcomes for these groups, and overall, lower life expectancy (Braveman et al., 
2010; Gray et al., 2018; Smedley et al., 2003). Despite increasing attempts to develop 
interventions to help physicians and hospitals improve the quality of care for racial/ethnic 
minority patients and reduce the disparity that exists, the literature indicates that P4P programs 
are not explicitly designed to address racial/ethnic disparities (Chien et al., 2007; Rosenthal et 
al., 2007). Therefore, while P4P has the potential to reduce racial/ethnic disparities, it also has 
the potential to exacerbate them. Examining how this can occur is critical in mitigating these 
negative consequences. 
This is where Casalino et al.’s article, “Will Pay-For-Performance And Quality Reporting 
Affect Health Disparities?” comes into play. Written in 2007, Casalino identifies four potential 
ways in which external incentives for quality may have the unintended consequence of 
increasing racial/ethnic health care disparities. Over 10 years have passed since the article was 
published, however. Therefore, my thesis will utilize Casalino’s proposed causal pathways as a 
framework for analyzing the literature and will add to the current body of knowledge 
surrounding P4P and racial/ethnic disparities. Furthermore, making use of the insights from the 
conceptual analysis, I will suggest ways of better deploying and researching P4P to reduce 
racial/ethnic disparities. Health care disparities remain one of our country’s major health 
challenges, and it is crucial that policymakers design programs and policies to minimize 
unintended consequences and reduce disparities. 
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A Pay-for-Performance Overview 
 
The goal of pay-for-performance is to incentivize value by rewarding higher quality care 
at lower cost, and the underlying P4P assumption is that improvements in quality are under the 
control of the provider (Damberg et al., 2014). Other factors that influence the success of P4P 
programs include the external environment, practice characteristics, and program features (Chee 
et al., 2016). The external environment includes regulations, policies, the patient population, 
patient preferences, and other quality improvement initiatives which can either promote or 
prevent the potential success of P4P programs (Chee et al., 2016). Practice characteristics include 
structure of the health care system, organizational culture, and available resources and 
capabilities (especially in information technology) (Chee et al., 2016). Program features include 
defining the patient population, the program goals, measures, financial incentive, and risk 
structure (Chee et al., 2016). In addition to these factors, key elements that must be carefully 
considered when designing and implementing P4P programs include provider engagement, 
individual versus group motivators, sizeable incentives, measure alignment and selecting high-
impact performance measures, making payment reward all high-quality care, data and other 
quality improvement support, and prioritizing quality improvement for underserved populations 




In 2014, Damberg and colleagues with RAND were asked by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services to evaluate available literature on Value-Based Purchasing models, 
including pay-for-performance (Damberg et al., 2014). The researchers identified 49 studies that 
examined the effect of P4P on process and intermediate outcome measures (37 studies examined 
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the effect of P4P on process measures for physicians or physician groups, 11 studies examined 
the effect of P4P on process measures in the hospital setting, and a single study examined the 
effect of P4P on process measures in other care settings) and 21 studies that evaluated the effect 
of P4P on outcomes (12 outcomes studies in physician groups, 6 in hospitals, and 3 in other 
settings) (Damberg et al., 2014). Overall, the results of the studies were mixed, and studies with 
stronger methodological designs were less likely to identify significant improvements associated 
with the P4P programs (Damberg et al., 2014). Any identified effects were relatively small 
(Damberg et al., 2014). 
With the literature having grown considerably since the RAND review, Mendelson and 
colleagues conducted another systematic review in 2017 with the funding support of the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs Quality Enhancement Research Initiative (Mendelson et al., 
2017). This review ultimately included 69 studies (58 were in ambulatory settings, 52 reported 
process-of-care outcomes, and 38 reported patient outcomes) (Mendelson et al., 2017). In the 
ambulatory setting, the review found low-strength evidence that P4P programs may improve 
process-of-care outcomes over the short term (2 to 3 years), but evidence on the longer-term 
effects was limited (Mendelson et al., 2017). Many of the studies reporting positive findings 
were conducted in the United Kingdom, where incentives are much larger than any P4P program 
in the United States (Mendelson et al., 2017). The review found low-strength evidence that P4P 
had little to no effect on intermediate health outcomes (e.g. changes in laboratory measures), 
despite inconsistencies among study results (Mendelson et al., 2017). Lastly, the evidence 
examining patient health outcomes was insufficient, because few methodologically rigorous 
studies reported these outcomes (Mendelson et al., 2017). In summary, the researchers found 
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low-strength, contradictory evidence that P4P programs could improve processes of care but 
found no clear evidence suggesting that they improve patient outcomes (Mendelson et al., 2017).  
Overall, the published evidence regarding improvements in performance from the P4P 
experiments of the past decade is mixed, and where observed, improvements were typically 
modest. Many of the published studies evaluating the impact of P4P programs suffer from 
methodological weaknesses that make it hard to determine whether the P4P intervention had an 
effect above and beyond other changes (e.g., investment in quality improvement support, public 
reporting, health information technology investments and support) that were simultaneously 
occurring to improve quality and restrain spending (Damberg et al., 2014; Mendelson et al., 
2017). More research is needed in order to generate the information required to fill gaps in the 
P4P knowledge base. 
 
Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities and Pay-for-Performance 
 
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care Quality 
 
Although equity is one of the six dimensions of quality defined by the Institute of 
Medicine, well-documented disparities in care between racial/ethnic minority patients and non-
Hispanic white patients persist (Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Quality of Health Care 
in America, 2001; Smedley et al., 2003). Figures 1 (Figure 19) and 2 (Figure 20) in the 
Appendix, directly from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s “2017 National 
Healthcare Quality and Disparities Report,” demonstrate these quality differences (Gray et al., 
2018). With decreased quality of health care, some groups of racial/ethnic minority patients (e.g. 
blacks and Hispanics) have poorer health outcomes and overall, lower life expectancy compared 
to whites (Braveman et al., 2010; Gray et al. 2018; Smedley et al., 2003).  
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Of importance to note is that minority patients vary tremendously in income, education, 
acculturation to the United States, and English language ability (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). 
Unintended consequences of the health care system are more severe for the more disadvantaged 
range of this spectrum (e.g. low-income blacks) (Braveman et al., 2010). For instance, Braveman 
et al. found that for many child and adult indicators examined (e.g. infant mortality, life 
expectancy at age 25, and self-reported health status), socioeconomic differences within black 
and white racial/ethnic groups were at least as striking as socioeconomic differences overall 
(Braveman et al., 2010). Because of these differences, this thesis will have a particular focus on 
the most disadvantaged racial/ethnic groups, who consistently experience worse quality of care 
than whites. This will become apparent in the analysis section, as low-income black, Hispanic, 
and American Indians/Alaska Native patients are referred to most frequently. Therefore, the 
working definition of “disparities” in this report will reflect overall differences in quality of care 
and outcomes, as opposed to after adjustment for socioeconomic status, underlying health status, 
etc. Furthermore, the working definition of “quality” will be broadly defined in that it 
encompasses structure, process, and outcome measures. 
 
The Potential Effects of Pay-for Performance on Health Disparities 
 
Increasing attempts have been made to develop interventions to help physicians and 
hospitals improve the quality of care for racial and ethnic minority patients and reduce the 
disparity that exists (Smedley et al., 2003). It has been acknowledged that one such intervention 
could be P4P programs. The Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Health Care stated in its report, “Economic incentives should be considered for 
practices that improve provider-patient communication and trust, and reward appropriate 
screening, preventive, and evidence-based clinical care. In addition, payment systems should 
   10 
avoid fragmentation of health plans along socioeconomic lines” (Smedley et al., 2003). As 
mentioned, however, health systems must be careful in implementing and evaluating these 
policies, as P4P incentives have not been explicitly designed to address racial/ethnic disparities 
and could have the outcomes of exacerbating disparities, improving quality for all groups 
equally, or even attenuating disparities (Chien et al., 2007; Rosenthal et al., 2007; Shakir et al., 
2018). Minute details of the measures, formulas for calculating performance, and rules for 
defining rewards and penalties can have substantial impact on “who wins and who loses,” and on 
unintended consequences, such as potentially worsening health care disparities (Chee et al., 
2016).  
Evidence to support substantive conclusions regarding the largest and most recent P4P 
programs and their effects on disparities is mixed and still insufficient (Shakir et al., 2018). The 
evidence we do have suggests that these programs at least have the potential to reduce disparities 
(Bhalla et al., 2013; Petersen et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017), but their effects vary widely, and 
further investigation is necessary (Shakir et al., 2018). Furthermore, examinations of whether 
P4P programs work to reduce or increase disparities are challenged by the lack of information at 
the patient level on race, ethnicity, education, SES, and other markers of vulnerable populations 




 Articles and studies were identified from the Ovid Medline database. A fairly extensive 
literature review was conducted of the pay-for-performance and racial/ethnic health disparity 
literature (gray and peer-reviewed). However, when extrapolation outside the P4P literature was 
needed, the review of the literature was to a lesser degree. 
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The “Four Causal Pathways” of How Pay-for-Performance Can 
Exacerbate Health Disparities 
 
 At the time Casalino et al.’s 2007 paper was written, there was limited data on the effects 
of performance incentives on racial and ethnic disparities in quality (Casalino, Elster, et al., 
2007). Casalino et al.’s paper is the first of its kind to suggest causal pathways, four specifically, 
in which P4P programs (and public-quality reporting programs) have the potential to increase 
disparities in health care delivery. (A fifth causal pathway is given, but it only applies to public 
reporting.) Specifically, Casalino et al. focus on physicians but state that analogous points can be 
made for hospitals and health plans (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007).  
The objective of my paper is to use the current literature in analyzing these pathways and 
determine the evidentiary strength for each one. What should be recognized is that these 
pathways could work differently for varying P4P intensities (e.g. 5 percent of provider income 
vs. 25 percent of provider income), provider levels (e.g. solo practice vs. a large hospital setting), 
and patient characteristics (e.g. minority patients with one vs. multiple chronic diseases). 
However, due to limited P4P and racial/ethnic minority literature, I take a broader approach in 
this analysis, such as how Casalino et al. did. 
 
Pathway 1: Reduction in income for physicians in poor minority communities.  
 
Casalino et al. hypothesized that P4P may adversely affect the income of physicians 
practicing in minority communities, particularly poor minority communities, and subsequently, 
reduce both the number of physicians working in such communities and their ability to invest in 
processes to improve quality (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). At the time Casalino et al.’s work 
was published, there was only one prior research study that suggested evidence for this “poor 
may get poorer” and “rich may get richer” phenomenon (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). This first 
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evaluation of a P4P program introduced for primary care physicians by the British National 
Health Service (NHS) found that practices serving lower-income populations did, in fact, have 
lower P4P quality scores and subsequently, received less earnings (Doran et al., 2006). Since 
Casalino’s article, more research has been published, and there is more clarity surrounding this 
issue.  
In 2008, Werner et al. published a longitudinal study of the relationship between hospital 
quality performance and percentage Medicaid coverage from 2004 to 2006 (Werner, Goldman, 
& Dudley, 2008). This study found that hospitals with high percentages of Medicaid patients had 
worse performance in 2004 and had significantly smaller improvements over time than those 
with low percentages of Medicaid patients (Werner et al., 2008). For instance, hospitals with low 
percentages of Medicaid patients improved composite acute myocardial infarction performance 
by 3.8 percentage points vs. 2.3 percentage points for those with high percentages, an absolute 
difference of 1.5 (p=.03) (Werner et al., 2008). This resulted in a relative difference in 
performance gains of 39 percent (Werner et al., 2008). The article concluded that incentives 
based on measures being used did have the potential to increase disparities among hospitals 
(Werner et al., 2008). Another hospital-based study with similar findings was published in 2013 
by Ryan. Ryan examined incentive payments in the first year of Medicare’s Hospital-Value 
Based Purchasing (HVBP) program (The program began in October of 2012.) to determine 
whether hospitals that care for more patients who are disadvantaged received lower payments 
(Ryan, 2013). Using a Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) index, with a higher DSH 
indicating the hospital’s patient population is at a greater socioeconomic disadvantage, Ryan 
found that hospitals with a higher DSH index value had significantly lower Medicare payment 
adjustments (p < 0.01) in the first year of HVBP, which resulted in a significantly more negative 
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expected financial impact (Ryan, 2013). For instance, hospitals at the 5th percentile of the DSH 
index expect a financial impact of +$18,900 (95% confidence interval), whereas those at the 95th 
percentile expect an impact of -$23,300 (95% confidence interval) (Ryan, 2013). These results 
demonstrate that hospitals caring for more disadvantaged patients did, in fact, fare worse in the 
first year of HVBP. 
In the primary care setting, Friedberg et al. published a study in 2010 in which they 
simulated P4P payments to 438 Massachusetts practices serving higher and lower shares of 
patients from vulnerable communities (Friedberg et al., 2010). Various preventive care 
categories were examined, ranging from cancer to diabetes screening, for practices with low to 
high racial/ethnic vulnerability and economic vulnerability (Friedberg et al., 2010). The authors 
found no instance in which practices serving the most vulnerable patient catchment areas would 
receive higher payments than other practices (Friedberg et al., 2010). In fact, through their 
simulation, they found that whereas the practice with low racial/ethnic vulnerability would 
receive a $15 median annual payment per patient for preventive care, the practice with high 
vulnerability would only receive $9 (p < .01) (Friedberg et al., 2010). Furthermore, total payment 
per practice would be $9,300 for low racial/ethnic vulnerability compared to $6,200 for high (p < 
.01) and per physician payment in practice would be $2,300 for low racial/ethnic vulnerability 
compared to $1,600 for high (p < .01) (Friedberg et al., 2010). These findings demonstrate that 
practices serving larger proportions of vulnerable populations would receive lower simulated 
payments for preventive care than other practices. 
The empirical literature overwhelmingly supports Pathway 1. Consistently documented 
and all-around statistically significant large effects (p < .05) indicate a reduction in income for 
physicians in poor minority community settings due to P4P incentives, and as a result, 
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communities and their patients are being harmed. The questions that then must be asked include: 
How much of this variation is internal to the practice versus external? Is this a practice-level 
problem or a social-determinant-of-health-level problem? In answering these and attempting to 
determine the causality of this issue, a policy approach can be better appropriately targeted. 
 
Pathway 2: “Color-blind” quality improvement programs.  
 
Casalino et al. claimed that P4P could increase disparities if it induces medical groups to 
create organized processes to improve quality, such as programs to help patients with chronic 
illnesses learn “self-management” of their illness, and if minority patients are less likely to 
benefit from these programs (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). An example Casalino provides is if 
education is given in a language or cultural style or at a literacy level that minority patients 
understand poorly or feel is culturally insensitive (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). The literature 
was sparse surrounding this proposed pathway when Casalino referenced it and is still sparse. In 
presenting this pathway, Casalino did not reference a particular P4P study but rather, cited 
general clinical studies that indicated a need to make approaches tailored (Lindau et al., 2006; 
Pham et al., 2005). Therefore, like Casalino does, inferences can be made in attempting to draw 
conclusions. 
While literature is scarce surrounding the potential impact of P4P on “color-blind” 
quality improvement programs, other literature indicates that quality improvement is, to at least 
some extent, “color-blind.” A 1996 empirical study linked 1990 census data on median income 
according to ZIP Code with 1993 Medicare administrative data for 26.3 million beneficiaries 65 
years of age or older (24.2 million whites and 2.1 million blacks) (Gornick et al., 1996). The 
authors calculated age- and sex-adjusted rates of various diagnoses and procedures according to 
race and income and computed black to white ratios (Gornick et al., 1996). The study found that 
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for every 100 women, there were 26.0 mammograms among whites and 17.1 mammograms 
among blacks (black:white ratio of .66, p < .001), and for every 1,000 beneficiaries, there were 
515 influenza immunizations among whites and 313 among blacks (a black:white ratio of .61, p 
< .001) (Gornick et al., 1996). The study concluded that race had substantial effects on use of 
services among Medicare beneficiaries and that Medicare coverage alone is not sufficient to 
promote effective patterns of preventive health service use by all beneficiaries (Gornick et al., 
1996). A little more recently, findings reported by the Commonwealth Fund’s 2006 “Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in U.S. Health Care: A Chartbook,” which used a variety of sources ranging 
from national surveys to single-site studies, demonstrated differences in experiences of services 
(Mead et al., 2008). For instance, black women were more likely to receive inadequate 
communication of their mammography screening results compared with white women, 
especially if the results were abnormal (Mead et al., 2008). Furthermore, black breast cancer 
patients were less likely to receive a complete diagnostic evaluation within 30 days of a patient-
noted abnormality or abnormal mammogram (Mead et al., 2008). Hispanics were less likely to 
adhere to antiretroviral therapy, in part due to language barriers and lack of interpreters (Mead et 
al., 2008). Blacks and American Indians/Alaska Natives were more likely than whites to have 
low birthweight babies, which could be diminished with timely prenatal care (Mead et al., 2008). 
Despite effect size not being recorded in this report, these are some of many examples in which 
participation in prevention efforts by minority patients is less than that of whites and where 
medical groups are not appropriately targeting quality prevention services and programs to meet 
the needs of racial/ethnic minority patients.  
A later 2007 paper in which Casalino was involved further attempted to examine this 
pathway by identifying two empirical studies that would suggest a “color-blind” approach in a 
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P4P program could result in maintaining disparity levels (Chien et al., 2007). One longitudinal 
study of 58,700 hemodialysis patients from 1993 through 2000 used a one-size-fits-all approach 
for improving hemodialysis dosing for patients with end-stage renal disease, without the 
recognition that disease burden and treatment choices may differ across race and ethnicity 
(Sehgal, 2003). It led to an overall 40 percent improvement in hemodialysis dosing across the 8-
year study period, but did not change the disparity between black and white patients in anemia 
management and nutritional status (Sehgal, 2003). In contrast, a multisite randomized clinical 
trial of 1,801 older adults comparing collaborative care for depression with treatment as usual in 
primary care had an inclusive approach by recognizing that disease burden and treatment choices 
were different across race and ethnicity improved depression care (Areán et al., 2005). The use 
of antidepressants by minority and nonminority elderly patients improved and the gap between 
minorities and nonminorities closed, even though minorities had more severe disease and less 
antidepressant use at the beginning of the intervention (Areán et al., 2005). 
Furthering this point, an example was given in the literature in which structural quality 
measures were specifically aimed at cultural competence. For some time, Massachusetts required 
hospitals to report on a range of activities related to caring for minority patients by using a 
checklist known as the Cultural Competence Organizational Self-Assessment (Blustein et al., 
2011). Sample items included “board of directors and senior management reflect the racial/ethnic 
mix of the actual population mix being served,” “policies exist to include racial/ethnic 
communities in the planning and design of health care services,” and “patient surveys are 
translated for non-English-speaking patients” (Blustein et al., 2011). For each of these items, 
hospitals were required to indicate their current level of activity (Blustein et al., 2011). In 2010, 
Massachusetts decided it would no longer use these structural measures due to some items being 
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unclear and subjective (Blustein et al., 2011). However, nationwide, the interest in cultural 
competence, and possibly inclusive quality improvement programs, is continuing (Blustein et al., 
2011). 
Concluding this pathway, there are no studies specifically analyzing how P4P induces 
medical groups to create organized processes to improve quality that have less benefits for 
minority patients. However, despite this lack of evidence, statistics from outside the P4P 
literature are consistent in their findings that “color-blind” approaches are occurring in health 
care. As a result, minority patients are using less preventive services partly due to their specific 
needs not being met. These findings indicate that organized processes to improve quality must 
factor cultural competence into their designs. Massachusetts was an example in which hospitals 
were being rewarded for making approaches more tailored. When analyzing this pathway, what 
must be considered is that equality (e.g. whites and minorities both improving by X percent and a 
disparity gap still existing) does not equate to equity (e.g. decreasing the disparity gap by 
recognizing that minority groups will need specialized and likely more services). Therefore, in 
order to improve disparities, P4P programs must acknowledge differences and place emphasis on 
creating tailored approaches to minority populations. 
 
Pathway 3: “Teaching to the test” might disproportionately affect minorities.  
 
P4P programs tend to identify multiple high-level goals that focus on improving clinical 
quality (roughly 75 percent of programs) and cost/affordability (roughly 53 percent of programs) 
(Damberg et al., 2014). However, less common are goals related to improving patient outcomes 
(34 percent of programs) and patient experience (17 percent of programs) (Damberg et al., 
2014). Casalino et al. claimed that these selective P4P goals and subsequently, measurements 
could induce physicians to focus their time and attention (consciously or unconsciously) on types 
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of care that are being measured, to the detriment of non-measured areas that could be equally or 
more important (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). Casalino et al. believed this “teaching to the test,” 
a phenomenon which has also been found in other industries, could disproportionately affect 
minorities (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). For example, efforts targeting certain diseases, such as 
HIV and mental health disorders, may be more relevant to vulnerable patients than metrics such 
as hospital-acquired infections, time to acute myocardial infarction treatment, or readmission 
rates (Shakir et al., 2018). 
In another 2007 article, Casalino et al. conducted a national survey of 556 general 
internists’ views on pay-for-performance and public reporting of quality scores (Casalino, 
Alexander, et al., 2007). When asked if measuring quality would divert physicians’ attention 
from important types of care for which quality is not measured, 22 percent of general internists 
strongly agreed with this statement, 39 percent somewhat agreed, 29 percent disagreed, and 11 
percent strongly disagreed (Casalino, Alexander, et al., 2007). Therefore, a majority believed that 
“teaching to the test” would, in fact, occur (Casalino, Alexander, et al., 2007). 
The quantitative literature also suggests this “teaching to the test” phenomenon occurs. A 
paper by Schlesinger et al. highlights this with two United Kingdom studies (Schlesinger et al., 
2015). One study specifically investigated whether the UK’s incentive scheme, the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF), led general practitioners to neglect activities not included in the 
scheme (Doran et al., 2011). Through conducting a longitudinal analysis of achievement rates for 
42 activities (23 included in the incentive scheme and 19 not included), the authors found that 
aspects of quality that were incentivized did better than predicted from previous trends, whereas 
those not incentivized fell below their trend lines (Doran et al., 2011). A second study of the 
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UK’s QOF found that because patient experience was only 2 of 146 incentivized metrics, patient 
valued aspects of quality did not have success (Campbell et al., 2010). 
These qualitative and quantitative research findings indicate that physicians are focusing 
their time and attention on types of care that are being measured but neglecting care that is not 
being measured. The question that then must be asked is, “Are we even measuring the right 
things?” If we are not incentivizing metrics that are relevant and important to racial and minority 
populations, then P4P will, in fact, exacerbate health disparities. 
In 2017, Eggleton et al. developed a taxonomy of measures used in the Merit-Based 
Payment System (MIPS) to assess what measurement gaps exist if a more specific focus on 
health disparities is to occur (Eggleton, Liaw, & Bazemore, 2017). By applying a theoretical 
model of health care quality as a coding matrix, the authors used a directed content analysis 
approach to categorize individual MIPS measures (Eggleton et al., 2017). In their analysis, the 
authors found that most MIPS measures related to aspects of clinical effectiveness, whereas few, 
if any, related to aspects of patient experience or interpersonal care (Eggleton et al., 2017). For 
instance, whereas an outcome measure such as “Experiences of patients in receiving health care” 
had one applicable measure (< 1 percent), a process measure such as “The effective application 
of knowledge-based care” had 122 (78 percent) applicable measures. These gaps suggest that 
MIPS, and other similar programs, may fail to measure the broader aspects of health care quality 
and even risk worsening existing disparities (Eggleton et al., 2017). However, if we are wanting 
to look at clinical outcomes, then current measures still do not address certain conditions that are 
of particular relevance to racial/ethnic minorities. For instance, HIV was previously mentioned 
as a disease that could be more relevant to vulnerable patients. Yet, looking at California’s 
Integrated Healthcare Association’s “Align. Measure. Perform. (AMP) Measure Set for 
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Measurement Year 2019,” one of the largest P4P programs, HIV is not mentioned in a single 
metric (Integrated Healthcare Association, 2019). 
Both the qualitative and quantitative literature evidence is consistent and strong for 
Pathway 3. “Teaching to the test” is occurring. Furthermore, there are evident problems with the 
narrow set of measures typically being used in P4P programs (Damberg et al., 2014; Wharam et 
al., 2011). When attempting to select more appropriate measurements with a specific focus on 
improving health disparities, health systems must take into account two things. First, health 
systems must consider whether equity is being appropriately measured (Anderson et al., 2018; 
Hasnain-Wynia, 2007; Rubin, 2018). Second, health systems must ask themselves if they are 
measuring metrics important to racial/ethnic minority populations, such as doctor 
communication or HIV metrics (Collins et al., 2017; Shakir et al., 2018).  
 
Pathway 4: Avoiding patients perceived as likely to lower quality scores.  
 
Casalino et al. stated that P4P might induce physicians and medical groups to avoid 
patients whom they perceive as being likely to lower their quality scores, particularly if quality 
measures are not adequately adjusted for the patients’ overall health status and perhaps for racial 
or socioeconomic characteristics as well (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). In the literature, such 
occurrences have been referred to as “racial profiling” (Werner Rachel M., Asch David A., & 
Polsky Daniel, 2005), “exception reporting” (Doran et al., 2006), “cherry-picking” (Chien et al., 
2007), and “risk selection” (Petersen et al., 2017). Casalino et al. found evidence that physicians 
perceive minority patients as less likely to comply with their recommendations for treatment and 
preventive services and more likely to have bad outcomes (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). They 
also found evidence that physicians subject to external incentives will try to avoid minority 
patients because they perceive them as more likely to have poor outcomes from treatments, even 
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when this is not the case (Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). Since Casalino et al.’s paper, several 
other papers have discussed patient avoidance in the P4P setting.  
In a 2009 qualitative study conducted by McDonald and Roland, 40 primary care 
physicians (20 from California and 20 from the UK) were interviewed about the unintended 
consequences of P4P (McDonald & Roland, 2009). A common theme that emerged included 
“Threats to the Ongoing Patient-Physician Relationship” (McDonald & Roland, 2009). Under 
this theme, it was reported that Californian physicians affiliated with the largest financial 
incentives expressed frustration about patients who refused to comply with their advice and the 
inability to exclude individual patients from performance calculations (McDonald & Roland, 
2009). As a result, some physicians reported behaviors such as forced disenrollment of 
noncompliant patients and other strategies reported by physicians included accusing patients of 
damaging their physician’s rating or lying to patients about the financial consequences of their 
refusing to comply (McDonald & Roland, 2009). On the other hand, English physicians, who 
were allowed to exclude or file an “exception report,” did not report feeling resentment or 
resorting to the methods used by the Californian physicians (McDonald & Roland, 2009). 
Whereas McDonald and Roland’s article gives us reason to believe patient avoidance is 
occurring, two quantitative studies have demonstrated otherwise. Using 2000 to 2006 Medicare 
data, a 2010 study by Ryan tested for differences in the conditional probability of receiving care 
at Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (PHQID) hospitals, which utilized pay-
for-performance (P4P) programs, for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and 
pneumonia before and after implementation of the PHQID between white and minority patients 
(Ryan, 2010). The author also tested for differences in the conditional probability that white and 
minority patients diagnosed with AMI received coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) in hospitals 
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participating and not participating in the PHQID before and after the implementation of the 
PHQID (Ryan, 2010). Ryan found little evidence that the PHQID reduced access for minority 
patients (Ryan, 2010). Only ‘‘Other Race’’ beneficiaries (It is unclear whether Other Race in this 
study consisted of unknown race categories or mixed race categories.) had a significant reduction 
(p < .05) in adjusted admissions to PHQID hospitals in the postperiod, and this was only for AMI 
(Ryan, 2010). Only marginally significant (p < .10) evidence of a reduction in CABG was found, 
and this also only occurred for Other Race beneficiaries (Ryan, 2010). Another quantitative 
study, published in 2016 by Petersen et al., evaluated the effect of a 2007 to 2009 P4P 
intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided by Veteran Affairs physicians and their 
primary care panels to black patients and whether it produced risk selection (Petersen et al., 
2017). Using a nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of 
financial incentives and no incentives (control), risk selection was measured by comparing the 
proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover 
(Petersen et al., 2017). The authors found that this P4P intervention did not produce risk 
selection, as there was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of 
patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover (Petersen et al., 2017).  
The Ryan et al. and Petersen et al. studies examine racial/ethnic minority patients but do 
account for additional factors that could result in avoidance, such as minority patients with and 
without (or perceived by clinicians to have) chronic conditions. In the UK, several P4P studies 
by Millet et al. have looked at addressing racial/ethnic disparities in the context of the 
management and control of chronic diseases, and one particular study specifically analyzed 
exclusion reporting. In this 2011 study, three cross-sectional analyses were conducted using data 
from the electronic medical records of all patients with diabetes registered in 23 general practices 
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in Brent, North West London between 2004 to 2005 and 2006 to 2007 (Dalton et al., 2011). 
Patterns of exclusions were examined for three intermediate outcome indicators (HbA1c, blood 
pressure, and cholesterol) (Dalton et al., 2011). Study results indicated that black and South 
Asian patients were more likely to be excluded from the HbA1c indicator than White patients 
[adjusted odds ratio = 1.64 (1.17–2.29) in 2005 to 2006] (Dalton et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
patients registered with practices in deprived areas were consistently exception reported at higher 
levels (Dalton et al., 2011). This finding mirrors those of Sigrid et al. in an ecological study of 
diabetes exception reporting (Dalton et al., 2011).  
The literature for Pathway 4 is inconsistent. The qualitative literature suggests avoidance 
can occur. However, the quantitative literature has mixed evidence, with significant evidence 
both for and against avoidance occurring. In attempting to gain more clarity, I did turn to the 
public reporting literature, but mixed evidence was also prevalent in these studies as well. 
Because of lack of conclusive evidence for P4P and other incentive programs, monitoring of 
avoidance must continue (Ryan, 2010). 
 
Conclusion on the Pathways 
 
For “Pathway 1: Reduction in income for physicians in poor minority communities,” 
there is consistent and strong evidence of harm. With a reduction in income for physicians in 
poor minority community settings, communities and their patients are being harmed. For 
“Pathway 2: ‘Color-blind’ quality improvement programs,” there is a lack of evidence. There are 
no studies specifically analyzing how P4P induces medical groups to create organized processes 
to improve quality that have less benefits for minority patients. However, despite this lack of 
evidence, statistics from outside the P4P literature are consistent in their findings that “color-
blind” approaches are occurring in health care, and a result, minority patients are using less 
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preventive services. For “Pathway 3: ‘Teaching to the test’ might disproportionately affect 
minorities,” there is consistent and strong evidence of neglect. “Teaching to the test” is 
occurring, and existing P4P programs do no incorporate metrics that can improve disparities. 
Lastly, for “Pathway 4: Avoiding patients perceived as likely to lower quality scores,” there is 
qualitative and quantitative evidence, but it is inconclusive. Some studies report avoidance 
whereas others do not. Reference Table 1 for a summary of the studies used in the analysis 
process. 
 
A Strategic Pay-for-Performance Policy 
 
A secondary objective of this paper is to consider a policy approach that targets one of 
Casalino’s pathways. What is important to note is that none of the pathways were “disproven” in 
the analysis, and all are viable options to target, either through further research or new policy 
efforts. However, because “Pathway 1: Reduction in income for physicians in poor minority 
communities” had consistent and strong evidence of harm, it would be easiest to insist that 
policymakers make use of these findings. “Pathway 3: ‘Teaching to the test’ might 
disproportionately affect minorities” also had consistent and strong evidence, but evidence 
demonstrated neglect, which is harder to “prove” to policymakers, unfortunately, over blatant 
harm. 
Therefore, from Pathway 1, it can be inferred that minority patients with low SES and the 
providers who serve them in these safety-net settings appear to be some of the most vulnerable 
targets in regards to P4P exacerbating racial/ethnic health disparities. This supports the previous 
point in this paper that unintended health consequences are more severe for the more 
disadvantaged range of this spectrum and paying special attention to racial and socioeconomic 
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patterns in health jointly can inform policies to address inequalities in both dimensions 
(Braveman et al., 2010; Casalino, Elster, et al., 2007). Reference Figure 3, which displays 
race/ethnicities and percentage with coronary heart disease (CHD), to see an example of this 
gradient (Braveman et al., 2010). 
In regards to a policy proposal, Werner, Ryan, and Friedberg’s studies on safety net 
providers in P4P programs being penalized financially suggest that currently used quality 
measures fail to account for differences in patient populations that could skew quality scores in 
favor of practices that care for higher-income, better-educated, and less-complex patients (Rubin, 
2018). Measures do not adequately translate differences in care among groups into a metric or 
statistic that indicates the extent of disparities, a component very important when designing P4P 
programs and attempting to mitigate health disparities (Blustein et al., 2011). Casalino et al.’s 
2007 general internist article validates this claim, with 85 percent of physicians believing that 
measures of quality are not adequately being adjusted for factors such as patients’ socioeconomic 
status (Rubin, 2018). Therefore, P4P programs must create a metric or statistic that adequately 
takes into account the patient population of a given provider or group of providers. In doing so, 
providers will not be penalized for external factors they cannot control, such as social-
determinant-of-health-level issues. 
Undertaking this type of policy would pose a challenge to many P4P programs. In order 
to differentiate between internal versus external factors affecting quality scores, data at the 
patient level needs to be collected on race/ethnicity and furthermore, socioeconomic and health 
status (Blustein et al., 2011). However, there is a lack of routinely collected data on demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics of patients to begin with (Damberg et al., 2014). As stated in a 
2018 JAMA article by a cardiologist and health services researcher, “We don’t have quality 
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measures that adequately sort out differences in quality vs. differences in patient population. We 
don’t even have the ability to collect and report high-quality clinical data…and that’s worse in 
under resourced settings” (Rubin, 2018). Furthermore, for underresourced practices with limited 
office time and resources, collecting such data will be difficult and imposing such a request on 
these practices could further burden the racial/ethnic minority patients whom they serve. 
Therefore, a policy which creates a metric or statistic to indicate the extent of disparities for a 
given office must provide underresourced practices with funding for the necessary personnel and 
infrastructure to collect this data.  
Overall, the policy I am proposing will require all practices involved in a P4P program to 
collect necessary patient-level data, with assistance given to those practices that have struggled 
in past payment cycles. Then, once data is collected, payers can calculate a metric or statistic that 
then allows for risk adjustment of a practice’s total quality score. The most important aspect to 
consider as well is that the policy will be viewed positively by minority populations and will not 
result in further disparities. 
Similar policies to this have begun to arise. In 2020, MIPS will begin adjusting payments 
based on the proportion of patients in a practice that are eligible for Medicaid, a marker for lower 
SES, as well as Medicare (Rubin, 2018). It has been indicated that this policy can be done on a 
rapid timeline, and though it may not be enough, policies such as this are a step in the right 




This thesis added to the pay-for-performance and racial/ethnic disparity literature. It used 
Casalino et al.’s causal pathways of how P4P can exacerbate racial/ethnic health care disparities, 
which were proposed over 10 years ago, as a framework and determined the adequacy of current 
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available evidence. This thesis highlighted that further research must be conducted and 
subsequently, policy change. 
As previously mentioned, the causal pathways could work differently for varying P4P 
intensities (e.g. 5 percent of provider income vs. 25 percent of provider income), provider 
contexts (e.g. solo practice vs. a large hospital setting), and patient characteristics (e.g. minority 
patients with one vs. multiple chronic diseases). Therefore, a P4P/health disparity research 
agenda moving forward must recognize this, and studies must be specific in answering questions 
with these variances in mind. Reference Table 2 in the Appendix for examples of how future 
research should attempt to hone in on these differences, as this could further help with targeted 
policy approaches. 
My thesis had a few limitations. First, Casalino et al.’s causal pathways were for both 
P4P and public reporting programs. By solely focusing on P4P programs, I only analyzed four of 
the five pathways Casalino had in mind. Second, due to the lack of literature on P4P and 
racial/ethnic disparities, my analysis had a broad rather than narrow focus and had to extrapolate 
from literature outside of P4P. 
In conclusion, the design features and the context in which a P4P program is 
implemented are critical determinants of program success, especially when attempting to reduce 
health disparities through P4P (Damberg et al., 2014). Although the past decade has witnessed a 
fair amount of experimentation with performance-based-payment models, we still know very 
little about how best to design and implement them in order to achieve desired goals, the optimal 
conditions for their successful implementation, and provider response to the incentives (Damberg 
et al., 2014). Despite this uncertainty, our health care system must step up to the challenge of 
accounting for differences in patient populations in payment models, such as P4P programs. If 
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we do not, racial and ethnic minority patients will continue to suffer as structural inequities built 
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Table 1: Causal Pathway Analysis 
 




physicians in poor 
minority 
communities 
Werner et al.  
(2008)  
A longitudinal study of the relationship between hospital 
quality performance and percentage Medicaid coverage 
from 2004 to 2006. This study found that hospitals with 
high percentages of Medicaid patients had worse 
performance in 2004 and had significantly smaller 
improvements over time than those with low percentages 
of Medicaid patients.  
Ryan (2013)  Examined incentive payments in the first year of 
Medicare’s Hospital-Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) 
program. Using a Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) 
index, Ryan found that hospitals with a higher DSH index 
value had significantly lower Medicare payment 
adjustments (p < 0.01) in the first year of HVBP, which 
resulted in a significantly more negative expected 
financial impact. 
Friedberg et al. 
(2010) 
In the primary care setting, P4P payments were simulated 
to 438 Massachusetts practices serving higher and lower 
shares of patients from vulnerable communities. Various 
preventive care categories were examined, ranging from 
cancer to diabetes screening, for practices with low to 
high racial/ethnic vulnerability and economic 
vulnerability. The authors found no instance in which 
practices serving the most vulnerable patient catchment 






Gornick et al. 
(1996) 
Linked 1990 census data on median income according to 
ZIP Code with 1993 Medicare administrative data for 
26.3 million beneficiaries 65 years of age or older (24.2 
million whites and 2.1 million blacks) Calculated age- 
and sex-adjusted rates of various diagnoses and 
procedures according to race and income and computed 
black to white ratios. The study concluded that race had 
substantial effects on use of services among Medicare 
beneficiaries and that Medicare coverage alone is not 
sufficient to promote effective patterns of preventive 
health service use by all beneficiaries. 
Mead et al. 
(2008) 
Used a variety of sources ranging from national surveys 
to single-site studies to demonstrate differences in 
experiences of services (e.g. black women were more 
likely to receive inadequate communication of their 
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mammography screening results compared with white 
women, especially if the results were abnormal). 
 Sehgal (2003) A longitudinal study of 58,700 hemodialysis patients from 
1993 through 2000 used a one-size-fits-all approach for 
improving hemodialysis dosing for patients with end-
stage renal disease, without the recognition that disease 
burden and treatment choices may differ across race and 
ethnicity. Led to an overall 40 percent improvement in 
hemodialysis dosing across the 8-year study period, but 
did not change the disparity between black and white 
patients in anemia management and nutritional status. 
 Areán et al. 
(2005) 
A multisite randomized clinical trial of 1,801 older adults 
comparing collaborative care for depression with 
treatment as usual in primary care had an inclusive 
approach by recognizing that disease burden and 
treatment choices were different across race and ethnicity 
improved depression care. The use of antidepressants by 
minority and nonminority elderly patients improved and 
the gap between minorities and nonminorities closed, 
even though minorities had more severe disease and less 
antidepressant use at the beginning of the intervention. 
Pathway 3: 







Conducted a national survey of 556 general internists’ 
views on pay-for-performance and public reporting of 
quality scores. A majority believed that “teaching to the 
test” would occur. 
Doran et al. 
(2011) 
Through conducting a longitudinal analysis of 
achievement rates for 42 activities (23 included in the 
incentive scheme and 19 not included), investigated 
whether the UK’s incentive scheme led general 
practitioners to neglect activities not included in the 
scheme. Found that aspects of quality that were 
incentivized did better than predicted from previous 
trends, whereas those not incentivized fell below their 
trend lines. 
Campbell et al. 
(2010) 
Studied the UK’s QOF. Found that because patient 
experience was only 2 of 146 incentivized metrics, patient 
valued aspects of quality did not have success. 
Eggleton et al. 
(2017) 
Developed a taxonomy of measures used in the Merit-
Based Payment System (MIPS) to assess what 
measurement gaps exist if a more specific focus on health 
disparities is to occur. By applying a theoretical model of 
health care quality as a coding matrix, the authors used a 
directed content analysis approach to categorize 
individual MIPS measures. Found that most MIPS 
measures related to aspects of clinical effectiveness, 
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whereas few, if any, related to aspects of patient 
experience or interpersonal care. 
Pathway 4: 
Avoiding patients 
perceived as likely 




40 primary care physicians (20 from California and 20 
from the UK) were interviewed about the unintended 
consequences of P4P. A common theme that emerged 
included “Threats to the Ongoing Patient-Physician 
Relationship.” Californian physicians affiliated with the 
largest financial incentives expressed frustration about 
patients who refused to comply with their advice and the 
inability to exclude individual patients from performance 
calculations. As a result, some physicians reported 
behaviors such as forced disenrollment of noncompliant 
patients. On the other hand, English physicians, who were 
allowed to exclude or file an “exception report,” did not 
report feeling resentment or resorting to the methods used 
by the Californian physicians. 
 Ryan (2010) Using 2000 to 2006 Medicare data, Ryan tested for 
differences in the conditional probability of receiving care 
at Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration 
(PHQID) hospitals, which utilized pay-for-performance 
(P4P) programs, for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), 
heart failure, and pneumonia before and after 
implementation of the PHQID between white and 
minority patients. The author also tested for differences in 
the conditional probability that white and minority 
patients diagnosed with AMI received coronary artery 
bypass graft (CABG) in hospitals participating and not 
participating in the PHQID before and after the 
implementation of the PHQID. Found little evidence that 
the PHQID reduced access for minority patients. Only 
‘‘Other Race’’ beneficiaries had a significant reduction   
(p < .05) in adjusted admissions to PHQID hospitals in 
the postperiod, and this was only for AMI. Only 
marginally significant (p < .10) evidence of a reduction in 
CABG was found, and this also only occurred for Other 
Race beneficiaries. 
 Petersen et al. 
(2017) 
Evaluated the effect of a 2007 to 2009 P4P intervention 
on the quality of hypertension care provided by Veteran 
Affairs physicians and their primary care panels to black 
patients and whether it produced risk selection. Using a 
nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial 
of three types of financial incentives and no incentives 
(control), risk selection was measured by comparing the 
proportion of patients who switched providers, patient 
visit frequency, and panel turnover. The authors found 
that this P4P intervention did not produce risk selection, 
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as there was no difference between intervention and 
controls in the proportion of patients who switched 
providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover. 
 Dalton et al. 
(2011) 
Three cross-sectional analyses were conducted using data 
from the electronic medical records of all patients with 
diabetes registered in 23 general practices in Brent, North 
West London between 2004 to 2005 and 2006 to 2007. 
Patterns of exclusions were examined for three 
intermediate outcome indicators (HbA1c, blood pressure, 
and cholesterol). Study results indicated that black and 
South Asian patients were more likely to be excluded 
from the HbA1c indicator than White patients [adjusted 
odds ratio = 1.64 (1.17–2.29) in 2005 to 2006]. 
Furthermore, patients registered with practices in 





Table 2: Future Research Agenda Examples 
 




physicians in poor 
minority 
communities 
This pathway is fairly well studied, and we know that the practices most 
impacted by this pathway are those that are smaller, have limited resources, 
and have sicker patients. However, it would be helpful to see how different 
P4P intensities impact this pathway. Would high-intensity P4P programs, 
such as those in the UK, be impacted significantly more than low-intensity 
P4P programs, such as those in the U.S? Furthermore, given current policy, 
another potential study could compare practices before and after the 






This pathway has a lack of evidence in the P4P sphere, but the outside P4P 
literature tells us that “color-blind” quality improvement programs are 
occurring. Would “color-blind” programs have a greater impact when 
racial/ethnic minority patients also have comorbidities, as these patients 
would require even greater appointment planning and time during 
appointments? In answering this question, a potential study could examine 
whether “color-blind” P4P approaches occur more often for patients with no 
or few comorbidities versus many. 
Pathway 3: 




“Teaching to the test” is occurring, and we know current metrics do not 
reflect those found to be most relevant for racial/ethnic minority patients. 
Potential metrics that would be relevant should have their effectiveness 
tested through studies. However, due to smaller and larger clinics having 
different capacities (e.g. infrastructure and patient sample size), metrics 
studied should be carefully selected for each practice context. For instance, 
in a smaller clinic setting, such as a practice with three to five physicians, a 
measure could be created to see if physicians ask all their patients (to ensure 
a large enough sample size) about conditions or social circumstances that 
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have a greater impact on minority households, such as stress from perceived 
discrimination. In contrast, a HIV measure could be created and measured 




perceived as likely 
to lower quality 
scores 
This pathway needs more conclusive evidence. An example of a future 
study that could help add to the literature includes assessing avoidance of 
white hypertensive patients versus minority hypertensive patients in small 
group practices and in large group practices. (Hypertension should be an 
appropriate condition for both types of practices, as it is highly prevalent 
among all racial/ethnic groups. If some small practices do not have a large 
enough sample size of minority patients, results among clinics could 
perhaps be aggregated.) Petersen et al. already conducted a study for risk 
selection in black hypertensive patients. However, it was in a larger 
Veterans Affair hospital-based setting. Therefore, testing this pathway in a 
smaller setting could be helpful. Furthermore, it could be studied whether 
there are differences in avoidance for individuals with just hypertension 
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Figure 3: Race/ethnicities and percentage with coronary heart disease (CHD) (Braveman et al., 
2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
